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THE MYTH OF THE FULLY INFORMED RATIONAL ACTOR 
STEPHANOS BIBAS* 
I.  THE OUTDATED LAISSEZ-FAIRE MODEL OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MARKET 
Traditionally, American criminal procedure has treated the jury trial as the 
norm, the basic event protected by the Bill of Rights and rules of criminal 
procedure.  The Supreme Court has developed a range of doctrines to ensure 
fair jury selection and instructions, confrontation and cross-examination, and 
the like.  But when it comes to waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty, the 
Court has largely assumed that defendants can readily forecast the costs and 
benefits of pleading guilty and do so only if plea bargaining serves their 
interests.  Put another way, the Court has taken a laissez-faire, hands-off 
approach, assuming that plea bargaining is a rational and well-functioning 
market in which price signals obviate regulation.  Free markets require only the 
most modest regulation to prevent force, threats, fraud, and deceit; 
governments need not go much further to help buyers assess the substantive 
desirability of deals.  In this respect, the case law presupposes economists’ 
stylized model of plea bargaining, in which each party chooses to enter into a 
plea agreement only if there is “mutuality of advantage.”1  The defendant gets 
a lower sentence; in exchange, the prosecution frees up time and money to 
pursue more defendants, and may also purchase one defendant’s testimony or 
cooperation to use against others. 
The free market works pretty well for commercial transactions, in which 
enough market participants are sophisticated and shop around that sellers must 
lower prices for everyone to match the going rate.  That model roughly 
describes much bargaining over civil settlements, where each side usually 
maximizes its own dollar recovery and attorneys’ fees are often pegged to a 
percentage of their clients’ recoveries. 
Unfortunately, plea bargaining is far from a well-functioning market with 
transparent, competitive prices.  For starters, the prosecutor is a monopsonist, 
the only buyer with whom a defendant can shop unless he will risk going to 
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 1. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
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trial.2  The prosecutor probably is not looking to maximize the overall 
punishment or sentence, but rather is seeking to guarantee a conviction and 
willing to trade off severity for certainty.  Likewise, the defense lawyer, often 
underpaid and overworked, has strong interests in moving his docket by 
getting his clients to plead quickly.  Appointed defense lawyers are often paid 
a salary, a flat fee, or a low fee per case, so there is little incentive to invest 
extra work and resources to turn over every stone.3  Also, defense lawyers vary 
greatly in their skills, experience, and relationships with prosecutors, which 
can further influence plea bargaining outcomes.4  Nevertheless, the Court put 
great faith in defense lawyers’ advice as the key to making defendants’ pleas 
knowing and voluntary and set a very high bar for overturning pleas based on 
deficient legal advice.5 
Perhaps the biggest problem is the assumption that defendants have 
enough information to rationally forecast their guilt and expected sentences 
and whether it makes sense to plead guilty.  Most defendants do indeed know 
whether they are guilty of something and whether they have an obvious 
defense, and most guilty defendants have a reasonable idea of the witnesses 
and other evidence against them.6  But criminal cases are much more complex 
than binary judgments of guilt or innocence.  Often, there is a range of criminal 
charges that can fit a criminal transaction, and prosecutors start out stacking 
multiple charges only to bargain some away.  There also is usually a range of 
criminal sentences that can fit a particular charge.  That is most obvious in 
unstructured-sentencing systems, in which a judge can give zero to twenty 
years for a robbery, for example.  Structured sentencing systems, though 
narrower, still preserve a range over which the parties can bargain.  In the 
federal system, for example, the top of the range is at least 25% higher than the 
bottom.7  Even when mandatory-minimum penalties can apply, prosecutors 
may agree to drop charges, let them run concurrently, or recommend 
reductions below the minimum in exchange for cooperation against other 
defendants.8 
 
 2. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1471, 1477–88 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 64–66 (1988). 
 3. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2477 (2004). 
 4. Id. at 2480–82. 
 5. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 6. Even so, stingy discovery rules can hurt defendants, especially those who are innocent or 
were too intoxicated or mentally ill to remember the details.  Bibas, supra note 3, at 2494. 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006) (limiting top of guidelines range to 25% or six months 
above the bottom of the range, whichever is greater); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
ch. 5, pt. A tbl. (2011) (setting forth federal sentencing ranges). 
 8. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2485. 
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Today, criminal convictions not only carry prison terms and fines, but also 
trigger a range of so-called collateral consequences.  A violent-crime 
conviction may cost a convict his right to carry a gun and thus to work as a 
police officer or security guard.  A sex-offense conviction, even for flashing or 
public urination, may require a convict to register as a sex offender and not live 
in large parts of cities near schools, parks, or playgrounds.  A drug conviction 
may count as an aggravated felony, making a noncitizen automatically 
removable from the country.  These consequences can matter greatly to 
defendants;9 someone who has lived in America for decades and has family 
here may care far more about deportation than about a sentence of probation or 
a few months in jail.  But because these consequences are nominally civil, they 
are not mentioned in plea agreements or plea colloquies.  Traditionally, neither 
judges nor defense lawyers have mentioned them to their clients, as they are 
imposed by civil agencies and statutes rather than criminal courts.10  Criminal 
proceedings remained formally divorced from civil ones, even though 
collateral consequences have in effect become predictable parts of the total 
punishment package.  And often, especially in cases of moderate severity, that 
package is negotiable.  Traditionally, a criminal defense lawyer might ask to 
have a one-year sentence bumped up from 365 to 366 days, to qualify his client 
for good-time credits.  But where a one-year sentence is the threshold for 
deportation, prosecutors and judges often will agree to lower a sentence by a 
day, to 364 days, if a defense lawyer is knowledgeable enough to request such 
a favor.11  Savvy, experienced defense lawyers knew enough to advise their 
clients and try to bargain over these consequences where possible, but many 
others did not. 
All too often, however, these plea-bargaining issues remained below the 
Court’s radar.  Guilty pleas, and especially plea bargains, waive most possible 
appellate issues.  Thus, disproportionately few plea-bargained cases make it all 
the way up to the Supreme Court’s docket.  Confronting an unrepresentative 
sample of cases, the Court continued to hyper-regulate trials while leaving plea 
bargaining largely untouched.12 
 
 9. See Gabriel J. Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., State v. Quintero Morelos, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); 1 
NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS § 10.1 (4th ed. 2007). 
 12. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011). 
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II.  PADILLA’S RECOGNITION OF PLEA BARGAINING REALITIES 
The traditional model has long since become an anachronism for the 95% 
of defendants who plead guilty.13  What they need is not a litany of boilerplate 
warnings about the procedural trial rights they are waiving, as criminal 
procedure rules require,14 because for most, a jury trial was never a serious 
option and the various trial procedures were immaterial.  Rather, they need 
clear information about the substantive outcomes they will face and how good 
a deal they are receiving.  They need to know not only the prison and parole 
terms but also whether they will lose custody of their children or be deported, 
forbidden to live at home, or barred from working in their profession. 
The bar had begun to acknowledge these realities.  Bar publications 
explained how to spot and understand immigration consequences of criminal 
convictions, and continuing legal education programs taught criminal defense 
attorneys how to navigate the thicket of immigration consequences.15  Good, 
experienced criminal defense attorneys increasingly saw explaining these 
consequences as part of representing the whole client’s interests within the 
criminal case.  But less experienced attorneys and those who do not specialize 
in criminal or immigration law remained ignorant or unconcerned with 
consequences beyond the criminal sentence itself.  Thus, many defendants 
were unpleasantly surprised, taking seemingly lenient pleas only to discover 
that they had unwittingly agreed to be deported. 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court for the first time confronted this cluster 
of issues in interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel.16  The Court acknowledged that plea bargaining is no 
longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm.17  A 
defendant who pleads guilty is not getting some exceptional break, but ought to 
be getting the going rate.  In contrast, the defendant who goes to trial will 
probably receive a heavier sentence than usual, just as only a few suckers pay 
full sticker price for a car.  A range of options is on the table, and defendants 
need to explore where within that range they can fall.  A competent defense 
lawyer “may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to 
craft a conviction and sentence” that serves both the prosecution’s and the 
defense’s interests.18  The parties trade risks for certainty and may likewise 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 15. See generally J. McGregor Smyth, From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for Mitigating 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 42 (describing 
ways to mitigate collateral consequences). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 1485 & n.13. 
 18. Id. at 1486. 
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agree to heavier criminal sentences or restitution in exchange for avoiding 
collateral consequences.19 
Plea bargaining is thus not an esoteric corner of the market reserved for 
indisputably guilty defendants who should be happy to receive any lower 
sentences as a matter of grace.  It is the market, and defendants need competent 
advice about the facets and consequences of the transaction before they agree 
to a deal.  A corollary is that a fair deal requires more than a rubber stamp by a 
lawyer with a pulse.  Defense lawyers must explain not only the criminal 
sentences, but also the other consequences that will clearly flow from the 
convictions.20  Not only affirmative misadvice, but even failure to offer advice 
where the correct advice is clear, violates the Sixth Amendment.21  That means 
that defendants are not left to fend for themselves, but have an affirmative right 
to at least minimally competent advice. 
Padilla thus goes well beyond the night watchman state’s minimal 
regulation of force, threats, fraud, misrepresentations, and broken promises in 
an otherwise laissez-faire market.  It imposes an affirmative obligation: the 
state must ensure that defendants have counsel who will help them to 
understand and evaluate the substantive merits of plea deals.  The goal is not 
simply to forbid inaccurate or coerced pleas, but to promote a more robust and 
intelligent choice among alternative outcomes.  That goes much further than 
Santobello’s ban on broken promises22 or Brady’s ban on threats, 
misrepresentations, and bribes.23  Brady had also required judges and counsel 
to explain the direct consequences authorized by the plea,24 but Padilla 
significantly extended that disclosure requirement as well. 
Looking backwards, one might see something vaguely similar in earlier 
cases that trusted competent defense counsel to ensure fair deals.25  But Padilla 
imposes a much more robust and affirmative requirement on counsel.  It 
follows the accumulated wisdom of the bar and the academy in gradually 
explicating defense lawyers’ professional obligations.  Rather than creating a 
new duty out of whole cloth, Padilla takes an incremental, common-law 
approach to discerning the minimum that a client can expect.  That minimum 
need not mirror best practices, but at least it evolves to adapt to new plea-
bargaining realities in a fluid market. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 1481–82. 
 21. Id. at 1483; see also id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring) (proposing a rule that would go 
beyond forbidding misadvice to require a generic warning to consult an immigration attorney 
about possible immigration consequences). 
 22. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971). 
 23. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
 24. Id. at 754–55. 
 25. E.g., id. at 756–57; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970). 
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III.  THEORETICAL MODELS VERSUS REALITY 
At root, the Padilla decision has gone a great way toward rejecting the 
simplistic assumption that defendants are fully informed rational actors.  
Anyone who has practiced criminal law for any length of time knows that few 
defendants resemble a cool, calculating, cerebral Vulcan.  Many are hampered 
by poor education, low intelligence, and limited proficiency in English.  Many 
mistrust their appointed defense lawyers, assuming that lawyers whom they are 
not paying are not looking out for their interests.  More importantly, though 
some defendants are experienced recidivists and think they know the system, 
few understand the process, the legalese, and the realistic range of outcomes 
very well.  Up until now, our system has trusted judges’ boilerplate plea 
colloquies, which are mostly about foregone procedural rights rather than the 
substantive merits of deals and which largely rubber stamp deals already 
struck.  Defendants need substantive information about likely outcomes before 
they strike deals from defense lawyers familiar with their particular cases. 
Padilla cannot solve all of these problems.  Given the chronic 
underfunding of criminal defense counsel and the wide variations in their 
quality and workloads, no constitutional doctrine could.  But it begins to attack 
the problem of poor information and chronic misunderstandings in plea 
bargaining.  One of the worst aspects of collateral consequences is that, even 
though they are often predictable, they are hidden because they take place 
outside the criminal courtroom.  Padilla brings them out into the light.  That 
will not help all defendants: those facing very serious charges, or those whose 
criminal transactions are extremely simple, may face deportation regardless 
and have little room to bargain.  But it warns them of what is coming down the 
pike and empowers them to explore whether there is anything they can do. 
There are many other ways to provide more information to complement 
Padilla’s new right to information about deportation.  Padilla’s right may or 
may not ultimately reach other consequences such as loss of custody, 
employment, public housing, or residency restrictions.  Even if the 
Constitution does not require it, good defense lawyers should mention at least 
these serious consequences where they are likely to apply.  Likewise, statutes 
and rules of criminal procedure can learn lessons from another area of law that 
has experimented with imparting useful information to inexperienced market 
participants: consumer-protection law.  Laws could require putting plea 
agreements in writing and in plain English, with graphics to help defendants 
grasp numbers and comparisons.  They could forbid or disfavor high-pressure 
tactics, such as threats to prosecute a family member, and require cooling-off 
periods before accepting serious felony pleas.  Mildly pro-defendant default 
rules of construction could force prosecutors to set out their understandings 
and terms clearly, so that defendants will focus on them.  And most of all, 
defense lawyers need not only better funding and lower caseloads, but also 
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better training and checklists to keep them from overlooking common issues 
and concerns. 
The root problem, however, is deeper and harder to fix.  There are two 
distinct barriers to informed decision-making: first, defendants must have 
enough information; and second, they must be able to understand, digest, and 
use that information.  Almost all of our efforts, from Boykin on,26 have gone 
into the first requirement.  If some information is good, we reason, then more 
must be better.  Padilla makes sure that defendants get some good information 
about immigration consequences.  But that important information risks 
drowning, unnoticed, amidst the many other warnings that defendants receive 
in preparation for and during their plea colloquy.  Litany after boilerplate litany 
can cause defendants to tune out, as the unimportant procedural wallpaper of a 
plea colloquy masks the crucial substantive information on which defendants 
ought to be focusing.  Mandatory disclosures often fail for this very reason.27  
Less is more.  But trial judges and legislatures are unlikely to pare back 
warnings, lest some appellate court reverse a conviction for omitting some 
minor point.  As happens with jury instructions, warnings can encrust the plea 
process like barnacles, becoming verbose and incomprehensible.  If it could be 
done, boiling down information to a simple grade or report card, and training 
defense counsel to offer better advice, would help more.28 
Improving the advice of counsel would also address a second problem with 
our current over-reliance on judges’ advisements at plea colloquies: the 
information comes too late to be of help.  By the time of the plea colloquy, the 
defendant is not legally but psychologically committed to the deal.  Given 
psychological sunk costs, time pressures, and all actors’ desires to get things 
over with, defendants have almost no time to reflect and weigh collateral-
consequence information if it comes at the end of the process.  They need 
substantive information about criminal and collateral civil penalties when they 
are weighing the deal in earnest. 
There are concrete things defense lawyers can do to improve the timely 
advice that defendants receive.  As Professor Jack Chin suggests, defender 
organizations can collaborate to create and update lists of collateral 
consequences for each jurisdiction, as the ABA is in the process of doing, and 
then to turn these into usable checklists.29  Lawyers must also question their 
clients and then summarize the most serious and common consequences 
 
 26. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
 27. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 737–38 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 743–44. 
 29. Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 685–87 (2011). 
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applicable to each client’s situation.30  They must, for example, learn their 
clients’ citizenship and professions in order to figure out whether they may 
face immigration or employment consequences.  They must focus on the type 
of convictions: violent, drug, and sex offenses each carry consequences 
specific to that category.  Margaret Love recommends that defenders take time 
to explore with their clients ways to avoid or mitigate collateral consequences, 
both by negotiating with the government at the front end of cases and through 
relief mechanisms at the back end.31  And, as Professor Ron Wright suggests, 
defense lawyers can band together into larger public-defender organizations 
with in-house immigration and collateral-consequence experts, to better handle 
complex areas in which not all line attorneys can become experts.32 
Padilla cannot revolutionize criminal justice; our system suffers from too 
many pathologies for a single decision to fix.  But it is a welcome recognition 
that defendants are not fully informed rational actors who need only the 
negative rights to be free of threats, broken promises, lies, and bribes.  They 
need affirmative help from their defense counsel to evaluate the fairness and 
desirability of their pleas, and Padilla is an important step in that direction. 
 
 
 30. Id. at 689–90. 
 31. Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From 
Internal Punishment to Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 113–16 (2011). 
 32. Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1515, 1536–39 (2011). 
